Does fiscal discipline restrain government from increasing its budget size? To answer this question, this paper investigates whether Wagner's law is satisfied for two types of states: U.S. states, in which fiscal sovereignty is established, and German states, in which fiscal transfer dependence is high and budget constraints are softened. In U.S. states, we demonstrate that Wagner's law is validated, while some of the balanced budget requirements weaken the validity of the law. In German states, we find an "inverse" law, especially after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland. The "inverse" law is a new channel of growth in government size, and means that soft budget constraints cause significant negative correlation between government size and output. These results are robust regardless of whether intergovernmental fiscal transfers are taken into account, while they quantitatively change the validity of the law.
Introduction
A number of industrialized economies have experienced substantial public sector growth over the last few centuries. The most prominent theory purporting to explain this long-run growth was proposed by the German political economist Adolph Wagner more than a century ago. His view is now commonly known as Wagner's law of increasing state activity. Many researchers have been interested in the validity of the law, which is a crucial factor for fiscal rigidity and the government debt problem. If the law is strongly supported, then government expenditure or budget size increases at a more rapid rate than economic growth; as a result, government is likely to be forced to abandon a flexible fiscal policy or to borrow excessively. With this background, over the past century, Wagner's law has been intensively tested for many countries and periods. However, earlier empirical works find mixed results for the validity of the law, and there is no general consensus among researchers on the law. 1 The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how fiscal discipline affects the validity of Wagner's law, and to shed new light on the vast empirical literature. To accomplish this, we focus on two federal states: the United States and Germany. This is because fiscal discipline at the state level is quite different between these two countries, as stated in 1 The Wagner's law literature is too voluminous to survey here. See, for example, Peacock and Scott (2000) and Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for extensive surveys of the literature. Bordo et al. (2013) and Potrafke and Reischmann (2015) . In U.S. states, in addition to a high degree of expenditure decentralization, tax bases and rates are determined with discretionary powers, and fiscal sovereignty is established. On the other hand, in German states, although the expenditure is restrained by federal law and almost all tax bases and rates are determined by federal law, the state governments have full autonomy in borrowing.
2 More importantly, the U.S. and German federal governments officially follow the no-bailout rule, but in Germany the credibility of the commitment is lacking and the softening of state budget constraints is a serious problem (see, e.g., Rodden 2003) .
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The present study follows recent contributions by Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth (2008) , Narayan, Prasad, and Singh (2008) , and Narayan, Rath, and Narayan (2012), who conduct state-level analyses of Wagner's law. As emphasized in those studies, there are several reasons why one should examine Wagner's law at the state level. 4 Among others, 2 Following the so-called golden rule, German states are officially allowed to borrow only for investment purposes, but in reality they can simply circumvent the rule. See Qian and Roland (1998) for the relationship between the decentralization of government and the soft budget constraint. 3 While the German federal government has prudent fiscal policies, state-level fiscal discipline is eroded. The "equivalence of living conditions" clause in the Basic Law compels the federal government to bail out a state that faces a debt crisis. Recent bailout episodes can be seen in the cases of Bremen and Saarland. See Rodden (2003) for more details of soft budget problems in German states. 4 While almost all researchers investigate the law using national-level data, a recent direction in Wagner's law literature focuses on validity at the subnational or state level. Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988) produced the first paper to employ state-level data to test the law. Abizadeh and Yousefi use time-series data for 10 U.S. states for the period 1950 to 1984, and their results support the law. More recently, applying a panel unit root, panel cointegration, and Granger causality analysis, Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth (2008) examine the law on the basis of data from Chinese provinces and find mixed results. Narayan, Prasad, and Singh (2008) conduct time-series analysis for the Fiji islands and important points in their discussion are summarized as follows.
First, given that Wagner did not take account of the influences of wars, a tacit assumption about the law is that the economy is under peacetime conditions. This is related to another leading theory, the so-called displacement effect (also known as the Our results uncover that, in both countries, fiscal transfers have non-negligible effects on state government size, and the introduction of fiscal transfers quantitatively changes the validity of the law. This suggests that if fiscal transfers are omitted, then the outcomes are highly likely to be biased. However, the qualitative results are the same regardless of whether fiscal transfers are considered. That is, our results reveal that the law is validated in the U.S. states, but, on the other hand, an "inverse" law is supported in German states.
Moreover, we find that the U.S. validity of the law is weakened by some of the balanced budget requirements. The German "inverse" law, a negative correlation between government size and output, is likely to be caused by the soft budget constraints, especially after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland in 1992. These opposite outcomes between the U.S. and German states imply that the characteristics of fiscal discipline are relevant to the validity of the law, and that the public sector can grow through different channels. This implication offers new insights into the empirical literature wherein heterogeneous consequences of the law are presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the present empirical framework and describes the data. Section 3 presents our empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
Empirical framework and data

Panel cointegration analysis of Wagner's law for U.S. and German states
As described in Ram (1987) , Peacock and Scott (2000) , and Durevall and Henrekson (2011) , multiple variables have been hitherto supposed to test Wagner's law. Among others, the specification proposed by Musgrave (1969) is commonly used in the empirical papers. In previous analyses, share of government expenditure in GDP is used as a proxy for government size, and real income per capita is used as a proxy for economic development (see, e.g., Mann 1980; Durevall and Henrekson 2011) . respectively. Note that GDP is the total value of goods and services produced within a state. If Wagner's law holds, then the coefficient 1 should be significantly larger than zero.
As mentioned in our introduction, the present study considers the potential effects of fiscal transfer payments on the validity of state-level Wagner's law (i.e., the cointegrating relationship between and ). 6 To this end, by introducing the third variable, we also consider the modified specification:
where denotes share of state fiscal transfers in GDP. 7 The coefficient 2 should be significantly positive if fiscal transfers have positive effects on state government size. 6 In the Wagner's law literature, all studies conduct cointegration analysis in a bivariate system. One notable exception is Chow et al. (2002) , who emphasize the importance of controlling the effects of a third variable on the cointegrating relationship between government size and economic development. 7 As described later, net state fiscal transfers can be negative in Germany, and ln is undefined.
As documented in Potrafke and Reischmann (2015) , although intergovernmental fiscal transfers are implemented to fund the budgets of state and local governments in the federal systems of both the United States and Germany, a key difference in fiscal transfer systems exists between the two countries. In the United States, the transfer payments are only vertical, and the federal government transfers to the states. However, in Germany, horizontal transfers between the states are performed in addition to vertical transfers.
Hence, the U.S. payments are basically positive, whereas the German payments can be negative in rich states. 
Datasets
All datasets are taken from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015) . Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) .
In the former test, homogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient across cross-sections is assumed; the latter test allows for heterogeneity.
[Insert Table 1 ] We therefore determine that all of our underlying variables appear to be integrated of order 1 ( (1)).
Panel cointegration tests
In the next step, the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) are conducted to examine whether there is a panel cointegrating relation in the bivariate and trivariate systems: (ln , ln ) and (ln , ln , ). We run four within-group tests and three between-group tests.
[Insert Table 2] The outcomes are reported in Table 2 . From Panel (A) of 
Panel cointegrating vector estimations
Now we present estimation results of the cointegrating vector. In order to estimate the vector, we utilize two methods: the fully modified ordinary least squares (hereafter FMOLS) and dynamic ordinary least squares (hereafter DOLS) methods. In what follows, while we report the results when lag and lead lengths of the DOLS equation are assumed to be unity, the results when their lengths are two are almost the same.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3 . Panel (A) of Table 3 shows the results of the bivariate system, which indicate that the coefficients of ln estimated by FMOLS and DOLS are positive and significant at the 1% significance level in the U.S.
case. In contrast, those of the German case are negative and significant at the 1% degree of economic growth in the long run, although the rules are not stringent in the short run, as stated in Poterba (1996) and Potrafke and Reischmann (2015) .
In order to capture the effects of fiscal stringency stemming from balanced budget rules, we identify regional differences in balanced budget requirements across the U.S.
states. To do this, as in Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011, The first measure is the ACIR fiscal stringency index (ACIR-FSI), which is based on the assessment of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. ACIR-FSI represents the extent to which "a state has a constitutional or statutory no-deficitcarryover provision," and its values are between 0 and 10. The remaining four measures are BBR2, BBR5, BBR7, and BBR9. All of them take 1 when a certain balanced budget requirement is in place, and 0 otherwise. A state where BBR2 is equal to 1 is forced to "balance the budget based on own-source revenues alone." In a state where BBR5 is equal to 1, "a limit is in place on the amount of debt." In a state where BBR7 is equal to 1, there exists "a control on supplementary appropriations" and "the opportunity to rebudget" is limited. In a state where BBR9 is equal to 1, "no deficit may be carried over to the next fiscal year or biennium."
12 For details of the measures, see Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011) .
Utilizing these five measures of balanced budget rules to split our observations, Table   4 explores the effects of balanced budget requirements on the validity of Wagner's law in U.S. states. Regarding ACIR-FSI, we follow Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011) and divide the sample into two groups; in one group ACIR-FSI is not lower than 8, and in the other group it is not lower than 6.
[Insert [Insert Table 5 ] Table 5 reports the results of the estimation. Comparing the subsample outcomes, one can detect remarkable changes of the estimated coefficients of ln between the two subsamples. Regardless of whether municipalities are included, the difference is really remarkable in both the bivariate and trivariate systems. 13 Comparing the former 13 When excluding municipalities, the coefficient of for 1993-2010 is significantly negative. This result arguably comes from the fiscal consolidation of the Maastricht Treaty as well as the bailout of Bremen and Saarland. In other words, for the purpose of fiscal consolidation, the state governments are forced to cut expenditures even when transfers increase.
subsample of 1975-1992 to the full sample results, the estimated values of 1 are shifted toward zero, meaning that real output per capita has a limited impact on government size.
On the other hand, with the latter subsample of 1993-2010, substantially lower estimated values of 1 are exhibited. This result supports the view that the "inverse" Wagner's law is more validated after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland in 1992. Thus, Table 5 provides strong confirmation of the hypothesis that the German "inverse" law appears to be primarily explained by the softening of state budget constraints.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined Wagner's law for U.S. and German states, which have different characteristics of fiscal discipline. This study sheds new light on the voluminous previous empirical works on Wagner's law in the following respects. First, to the best of our knowledge, the present study is first attempt to investigate the law for U.S. and German states, with the exception of Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988) , who study 10 U.S.
states. Second, our study differs from all predecessors that investigate the law at the state level in that fiscal transfers are taken into account. Third, although almost all previous studies use time-series data, this is the first to use the panel cointegration approach to test the law, except for Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth (2008) and Narayan, Rath, and Narayan (2012) .
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, we show that significant effects of fiscal transfers on state government size are shown in most samples of the two countries.
While state-level data are useful to test the law, as mentioned earlier, this outcome provides an important suggestion that fiscal transfers should be taken into account when exploring Wagner's law at the state or subnational level. Second, we demonstrate that characteristics of fiscal discipline are relevant to the validity of the law and that the qualitative results are the same regardless of whether fiscal transfers are considered. In other words, we provide strong evidence to support the law in U.S. states and the "inverse" law in German states. For the U.S. results, it is suggested that some of the balanced budget requirements weaken the validity of the law.
Third, and most important, we find the German "inverse" law, especially after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland. This finding points to a new channel of growth in government size: soft budget constraints can cause significant negative correlation between government size and economic development.
Although the relationship between Wagner's law and fiscal discipline appears to be overlooked in previous empirical works, our results suggest that it is essential to take into account characteristics of fiscal discipline when evaluating the law. This suggestion offers new insights into the empirical literature wherein mixed results on the validity of the law are presented. 
